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Biosecurity is widely viewed by industry to be critical to the economic prosperity of New Zealand. 
This article is an overview of the challenges this country faces in preventing and managing pest, 
weeds and diseases. The next 10 years will see dramatic changes in how scientists, industry and the 
general public contribute to the biosecurity system. These changes should lead to a more efficient and 
coordinated approach, but they will also increase uncertainties about the way we predict and respond 
to the future risks we might face.
Biosecurity describes the strategies, regulations and 
activities involved in the exclusion, eradication or effective 
management of risks posed by pests, weeds and diseases 
to the economy, environment and human health. There 
are at least three good reasons why biosecurity is arguably 
more significant to New Zealand than any other country 
in the world. First, relative to most developed countries, 
our economy depends on vibrant agriculture, horticulture 
and forestry sectors – making up 70 per cent of our 
export earnings. 
Second, our primary industries mainly depend 
on the productivity of exotic species, be they livestock, 
pasture grasses, pip fruit and stone fruit, forestry trees or 
aquaculture species such as salmon and Pacific oysters. 
The fact that these species do so well in New Zealand 
is partly a reflection that they have left many pests and 
diseases behind in their regions of origin. Third, the long 
isolation of New Zealand and rapid transformation of our 
landscape to support primary production means that our 
agricultural and forestry systems are very simplified and 
lack effective native predators and parasites which might 
stem the incursion of new pests.  This can result in severe 
outbreaks of pest species which are viewed overseas as 
relatively benign. 
Such is the case of the eucalyptus tortoise beetle, 
which is rare in its native Australia but is the most 
serious defoliator of eucalypts in New Zealand, virtually 
curtailing the planting of several species. In general, the 
relative freedom from pests and diseases combined with 
excellent growing conditions in this country has made 
the primary sector highly competitive globally. However 
it also means that even a single incursion of a high profile 
pest or disease could have major economic effects. 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand has estimated 
that an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease would reduce 
gross domestic product by $8 billion after one year and 
$13 billion after two years, effectively devastating our 
economy. How well are we doing in protecting the 
border and securing our market advantage? This overview 
aims to summarise recent developments in biosecurity, 
examine how best we can judge the performance of our 
biosecurity system, discuss the roles of citizens, scientists, 
industry and government in preventing and managing 
incursions, and show some of the future challenges. 
The cost of protecting our border
Not surprisingly, maintaining a world-class biosecurity 
system to protect New Zealand is often the top priority 
among leaders of our primary industries. Nevertheless, 
our current awareness of the importance of biosecurity 
has come at a cost of learning some tough lessons. For 
example, pastoral weeds are conservatively estimated 
to cost the New Zealand economy $1.2 billion each 
year in lost animal production and control costs. Annual 
production losses attributable to invertebrate pests have 
been estimated to be around $880 million. Overall, the 
losses to the primary sector from pest, weed and disease 
incursions account for almost two per cent of gross 
domestic product. This might not sound much, but given 
that primary industries contributed 6.4 per cent of total 
gross domestic product in 2012, it represents a substantial 
loss of the potential value that primary industries could 
bring to the country. 
It is against such biosecurity challenges that the 
government’s Growth Agenda aims to increase the ratio 
of exports to gross domestic product from 30 per cent to 
40 per cent by 2025. The considerable efforts of primary 
industries to rise to this challenge could easily be offset 
by one or more pests or diseases. 
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The financial effect of a Queensland fruit fly 
incursion on New Zealand’s kiwifruit industry could 
cost as much as $430 million if it triggered a severe 
market reaction. This would jeopardise the short-term 
financial viability of the $1.5 billion industry. Reducing 
biosecurity risks helps encourage investment in primary 
industry and freedom from pests and diseases makes us 
a more attractive exporter. Undoubtedly, biosecurity 
must play a critical role in such potential productivity 
and economic growth. 
Signiﬁcant investment  
New Zealand therefore invests heavily in biosecurity 
activities to protect its economy, environment and people 
from the risks associated with the introduction of new 
plant and animal diseases, pest insects and weeds. There is 
a wide range of biosecurity activities along a continuum 
which starts offshore and ends in our own backyards. 
Work beyond our borders aims to reduce the risks posed 
by our trading partners and includes undertaking risk 
assessments, developing import health standards, and 
negotiating favourable trade agreements. 
The most visible aspect of biosecurity concerns is at 
the New Zealand border where inspection and screening 
are in place to stop pests, diseases and weeds from entering 
our country. Within the border, a range of additional 
activities is in place to detect, locate, eradicate or manage 
organisms which have crossed the border and established 
in this country. This all requires considerable investment 
from the border to the boardroom. 
The government invests around $200 million a year 
in biosecurity via the Ministry for Primary Industries. 
However, this is a fraction of the public funds spent on 
biosecurity by other government departments, regional, 
city and local councils, Crown Research Institutes and 
universities. Industry invests significantly by import 
and export compliance as well as crop and livestock 
protection. For example, importers contribute between 
$80 million and $125 million annually to the cost of 
biosecurity management in New Zealand using levy 
income as well as compliance and clearance costs.
How well are we doing?
Is New Zealand getting good value for its investment? 
Arguably, MPI is the most important Ministry in terms 
of its role in securing a positive economic future for this 
country. As a result it probably receives more detailed 
scrutiny than any other ministry and when it occasionally 
drops the ball the ramifications can be dramatic. Few can 
be unaware of recent incursions which have had major 
implications for primary industry − 
• The introduction of PSA, the cause of bacterial 
kiwifruit vine disease, has had a significant effect on 
the sector and will probably cost the economy between 
$310 million and $400 million over five years
• The tomato-potato-psyllid, a sucking bug, which has 
wiped out $86 million in potato production in just 
one year
• In aquaculture annual production losses from a single 
species of sea squirt, Styela clava, have been estimated 
to be $15 million. 
No national biosecurity system can be 100 per 
cent effective and it is easy to focus on the few species 
which have breached the border rather than the countless 
many that have probably been kept out by effective 
risk assessment, inspection and surveillance procedures. 
Yet it is impossible to estimate the effectiveness of MPI 
biosecurity operations in simple percentages of incursions 
avoided and they are therefore often judged against what 
slips across the border. 
It is also easy to forget the successes which MPI, and 
its predecessor the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 
have had in responding to incursions and preventing the 
establishment of economically important pests. The net 
economic benefit of eradicating forestry pests such as the 
white tussock moth, painted apple moth, gypsy moth and 
fall webworm are estimated to be as much as $870 million. 
Ministry performance
The Office of the Auditor General examined the 
performance of biosecurity management by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry and MPI in 2002, 2006 and 
2013 and in each case has found there is considerable 
room for improvement. This is not surprising given 
the thoroughness of investigations undertaken and 
the transformation of New Zealand agriculture, trade 
and tourism over the last decade. The regular checks 
and balances on the performance of the New Zealand 
biosecurity system are at least a good sign that the 
government takes the problem seriously and it has resulted 
in continuous improvements in the way MPI operates. 
MPI has also continued to support a Biosecurity 
Ministerial Advisory Committee to provide independent 
advice on the performance of the overall biosecurity 
system. Drawing on experts from across primary 
industry sectors, biosecurity scientists and leaders in 
Volume 18 Number 4 December 2014 • 25
Primary Industry Management
regional government, the committee focuses on how the 
biosecurity system can help in creating an environment 
which supports growth and sustainability across primary 
industry. It also helps to identify opportunities to improve 
the performance, efficiency, cost-effectiveness and 
capability of the biosecurity system. 
The committee’s current work programme is 
focused on assessing progress towards adopting the 
recommendations of the most recent report from the 
Office of the Auditor General. These include − 
• Lifting the profile of biosecurity nationally to ensure 
citizens take personal responsibility for biosecurity
• Establishing suitable performance measures for MPI
• Assessing national readiness for future incursions
• Discussing how best to manage compliance and 
enforcement. 
It is our place to protect
MPI is the lead agency responsible for biosecurity, but 
preventing the introduction of harmful species into the 
country is the responsibility of everyone. An independent 
review of the PSA incursion highlighted that a systemic 
lack of communication and information exchange among 
industry, science providers and MPI was at the heart of the 
problem. Ensuring that there is a well-connected national 
capability for biosecurity is essential. There are at least four 
groups which need to be mobilised and coordinated to 
ensure a robust biosecurity system –
• The general public
• Science providers
• Biosecurity specialist organisations, including central 
and local government
• Industry. 
Role of the public
A fundamental question is how much involvement is there 
from the general public? Episodes of the TVNZ Border 
Patrol reality programme, depicting inspections at the New 
Zealand border, are popular and may be seen by up to 10 
per cent of the population. We might therefore expect 
New Zealanders to be well informed and important 
contributors to the biosecurity system. However, much 
of this emphasis has been on ensuring citizen compliance 
with regulations about the importation of goods and 
movement of risk organisms, either deliberately or 
unintentionally. 
It is often stated that we do not make enough 
of the over four million pairs of eyes and ears that 
could support national surveillance programmes. Many 
incursions are first detected by members of the general 
public. With increasing pressure from new incursions, can 
the contribution of citizens be made significantly more 
effective and widespread to secure greater biosecurity 
benefits? As yet, this potential is not fully recognised. 
Understanding the limits of citizen involvement and the 
barriers to participation are essential to maximising their 
contribution to the biosecurity system. The public role 
in surveillance may often be limited in scope due to a 
mostly urban population with little knowledge of pest 
identification as shown in the graph.
Similarly not all management programmes meet 
with public sympathy, as is the case for aerial spraying 
of pesticides, the release of bio-control agents, or the 
prohibition of the sale of certain species. Maintaining 
awareness of biosecurity among the general public and 
the role they may play is essential. MPI has run several 
successful social marketing campaigns to change citizen 
behaviour and a similar effort should be invested in 
encouraging them to be active members of the biosecurity 
system. Unfortunately, certain lines of evidence suggest 
that interest in biosecurity may be waning, at least 
compared to Australia.
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There has been a marked decline in online 
interest since 2011, a period which coincided with the 
retirement of the Biosecurity New Zealand brand. This 
brand was synonymous with the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry. However, perhaps further thought should 
be given to a brand which is not institution-specific 
and could be used on all biosecurity relevant materials 
produced by MPI as well as primary industry sectors, 
regional councils and other government departments. It 
would give a better idea of how biosecurity impinges on 
the everyday activities of each of us in New Zealand and 
that we all have a role to play in protecting the country.
Working together
New Zealand benefits from a productive scientific 
community researching biosecurity problems. This 
includes scientific teams in government departments 
and ministries as well as those employed by industry, the 
Crown Research Institutes and universities. Individual 
teams undertake excellent science, but research is often 
sector-specific, it addresses different targets such as 
animal, aquatic or plant health, and it is mainly based 
within the natural sciences. The different groupings do 
not currently communicate effectively with each other 
and often approach biosecurity from diverse perspectives 
using different emphases and methods. There remains 
considerable scope to bring these research communities 
together to help improve ideas and approaches, ensuring 
a more consistent approach to biosecurity. 
Australia
New Zealand
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One example of where a more collaborative method 
has proved successful is Better Border Biosecurity, a 
science cooperative which researches ways to reduce the 
entry and establishment of new plant pests and diseases. 
The joint venture integrates investment and expertise 
from fi ve science agencies – Plant & Food Research, 
AgResearch, Scion, Landcare Research and the Bio-
Protection Research Centre at Lincoln University. 
There are three end-users – MPI, the Department of 
Conservation and the New Zealand Forest Owners 
Association. 
Much of the research undertaken in New Zealand is 
still focused on only one aspect of the biosecurity system 
such as pre-border or post-border. An overall perspective 
is required which bridges the gaps between these research 
activities, provides the necessary context and appraises 
the biosecurity research portfolio. Biosecurity is an 
interdisciplinary topic which requires the involvement of 
social scientists, veterinarians, epidemiologists, economists, 
geographers, political scientists and information 
technologists. It has been weak on research. 
New programme
These limitations may be about to be resolved with the 
recently launched National Science Challenge, a 10-year 
programme to fund research in New Zealand. Biosecurity 
is represented in the Biological Heritage Challenge, which 
focuses biosecurity research on a series of important 
concerns including − 
• Inspir ing citizens to contribute to biosecurity 
surveillance and compliance
• Looking ahead for future threats
• New management methods and strategies
• Improved risk assessment
• Increasing the resilience of productive systems to pest, 
disease and weed threats. 
Using new money and existing funding, the 
Biological Heritage Challenge will use scientists from 
different institutions and disciplines for common aims. 
It will be important for the primary industry sector to 
be involved and kept abreast of this important change in 
the way biosecurity science is directed.
Another option is the National Biosecurity 
Capability Network. This is a joint initiative between 
MPI and AsureQuality to manage a network of people 
and facilities which can be deployed in response to a pest 
incursion. Support has grown rapidly in the last year and 
appears to be settling at around 120 organisations. 
Most partner organisations are involved in animal 
capability, which refl ects the concern that New Zealand 
resources would be stretched should a foot-and-mouth 
disease outbreak occur. However, the horticultural and 
forestry sectors still need to improve, particularly in 
relation to surveillance and organism management. The 
network was found to function effectively in the recent 
Queensland fruit fl y incursion response in Whangarei, 
but the robustness of the network to different types of 
incursions or responses in less populated areas has not 
been assessed.
Government industry agreements
A further option is the government industry agreement 
on biosecurity readiness and response which aims to 
improve joint decision-making and cost-sharing between 
primary industry and MPI. Closer collaboration should 
help ensure a more coordinated response and better results 
when incursions happen. Most industries have welcomed 
the opportunity to have a greater say in how incursions 
are managed. However several have expressed concerns 
that their responsibilities only start this side of the border 
rather than infl uencing import health risk assessments and 
border interventions. Kiwifruit Vine Health signed the 
fi rst government industry agreement in May 2014 and 
more than a dozen other industry partners have signed a 
preliminary memorandum of understanding. 
There is still uncertainty around how the government 
industry agreements will work. The government has 
agreed that industry will pay no more than 50 per cent 
of any response costs, but these costs can run into tens of 
millions of dollars. Once an incursion has taken place an 
industry sector may be facing not only lost production, 
but also market access problems. Bearing the costs of 
responding to a major incursion could be one fi nancial 
challenge too many. Greater involvement by industry 
in decision-making cannot be a bad thing, but it will 
probably take an actual incursion to test how well the 
government industry agreement model might work. Let 
us hope it is not a big one.
Working together 
What we can see is that as the scale of the biosecurity 
challenge facing New Zealand incre ases,  the responsibility 
for managing the threat of risk organisms is becoming 
progressively devolved, particularly within our borders. 
As organisations take on responsibility for biosecurity, 
the dynamics of the system will change from a mainly 
centralised government responsibility to a wider network 
of participants. 
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If managed well, this should ensure greater 
connection and that appropriate funding is allocated to 
the risks of greatest concern. Working together should 
also ensure responses to biosecurity incursions are run 
more effi ciently. Several important questions arise about 
this new model of biosecurity management −
• How robust and dependable will it be? 
• Will it possess the necessary information fl ows and 
feedbacks to perform effectively? 
• What will be its emerging properties and could they 
impede biosecurity management? 
• Will multiple partners delay response times so that 
opportunities for eradication are lost?
Recent failures in the biosecurity system have been 
attributed to the frequent restructuring of the ministry 
responsible. However, we should ensure that the efforts 
to make this more devolved biosecurity system a success 
do not divert resources from future threats. 
Looking to the future
The dynamic nature of biosecurity risks faced by New 
Zealand over the medium to long term requires foresight 
and the ability to apply this in response to emerging 
biosecurity risks. Foresight is more than simply keeping 
abreast of potential problems reported overseas. It should 
apply climate, economic, demographic, agriculture and 
trade forecasts to identify future events which might result 
in new threats to the New Zealand biosecurity system. 
For example, climate change is likely to exacerbate the 
existing problems as pests, weeds and diseases in the 
North Island move further south and will also open up 
the country to new threats that previously found the 
environment unsuitable. 
Population growth, increasing urbanisation, novel 
crops, changing agricultural practice and the exploitation 
of terrestrial and marine resources will alter the resilience 
of the productive environment to established and potential 
future pest species. As an example, native manuka beetles 
have become a serious pest on recently developed pastures 
on the West Coast. Flipping soil to improve pastures has 
exposed sandy soils, which appears to be a perfect habitat 
for the pest. 
The future will become increasingly uncertain and 
the biosecurity system should be designed to deal with 
this uncertainty. This means that risk assessments need to 
be dynamic and account for future uncertainty, including 
preparing for worst-case scenarios. These scenarios need 
to be worked up with industry partners, not only to secure 
the most effective response in the event of an incursion, 
but also to adapt their practices to minimise future risk 
and build resilience into their production systems.
Preventative measures addressing the risks outside the 
border, along with surveillance and interceptions at the 
border, are widely viewed as the most cost-effective method 
to manage future threats. However improving border 
biosecurity is not a foolproof strategy as it can never hope 
to be 100 per cent effective. In addition, many future pests, 
weeds and pathogens may already be established, although 
at low density. They may become increasingly important 
as a result of contemporary evolution, such as pesticide 
resistance in the varroa mite, or relaxation of environmental 
constraints as a result of climate change. 
There are considerable economic, environmental 
and social benefi ts in the early identifi cation of future 
post-border threats, of containing outbreaks and 
slowing their spread before their effects can be fully 
realised and management required. Insuffi cient effort 
has been made to increase the cost-effectiveness of post-
border interventions. Too often a species is deemed too 
widespread for the benefi ts of a response to outweigh 
its costs. In many cases the benefi ts of mounting a 
response may be under-estimated. This is relevant where 
a particular pest species may limit future options for the 
development of new crops, or be found at a later date to 
be an important vector of plant pathogens.
Finally, the ability to respond to these threats is 
progressively being weakened as a result of rising instability 
in current biological controls and the falling rate of 
pesticide registrations and public acceptance of chemical 
residues in food. Withdrawal of older broad-spectrum 
pesticides will reduce the arsenal available to control 
pests, but New Zealand’s small market cannot support 
the development costs of replacements, particularly for 
niche crops. As a result, our primary production systems 
face increased environmental regulation and international 
markets demanding green credentials. 
There is also the reality that, as intensifying 
production reaches its technical limit, resilience to damage 
is lost leading to higher sensitivity to the effects of pests. 
These increasingly complex and threatening interactions 
will require new and integrated approaches to biosecurity 
and will depend on new technology for managing pests, 
diseases and weeds to stem a rising tide of threats. New 
Zealand must invest strategically in this area.
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